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Abstract 
I develop a critical constructivist evolutionary theory of international financial 
institutions and arrangements. Specifically, I analyze the role of IMF under the present 
globalization moves and repeated financial crises by following such a critical 
constructivist evolutionary theory of international financial institutions. Furthermore, the 
potential for reforms in the wake of the global financial crisis and the great recession is 
analyzed from a dialectical social constructivist viewpoint that combines the power of --
sometimes conflicting--- norms and ideas with the underlying structural contradictions to 
produce a “critical-constructivist” analysis of the potential for change. It is shown that 
IMF must and can change in a direction which allows for greater national policy 
autonomy. It is also shown that the IMF needs complementary regional institutions of 
cooperation in order to create a stabilizing hybrid global  financial architecture that will 
be more democratic and Keynesian-Kaleckian in terms of its theoretical underpinnings. 
Thus regional financial architectures will need to be integral parts of any new global 
financial architecture(GFA).The tentative steps taken towards regional cooperation in 
Asia since Asian financial crisis are discussed to illustrate the opportunities and 
challenges posed by the need to evolve towards a hybrid GFA. The opportunities and 
challenges arising from the current global crisis are analyzed in this context. 
 
Keywords: Global Financial Governance, Global financial architecture, Regional 
financial architecture, Hybrid Global financial architecture, Global Financial Crisis, 
Reforming the IMF, Capital Flows, Exchange Rates, Social Construction. 
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1.Introduction: 
 
 
The subprime crisis in the US which soon ballooned into a full-blown Financial Crisis 
and the contagion it created has unleashed a process of questioning the wisdom of the 
standard recipe of the Washington consensus. This  is still continuing; but the real costs 
of crises have forced on the policy agenda  the question of what kinds of national and 
international policies and institutions are appropriate during the current period and in the 
foreseeable future. As the Stglitz commission report put it: 
 
“…the standard policy nostrums  - that countries should have sound macroeconomic 
policies strong governance, transparency, and good institutions – may be less than 
helpful. Countries that held themselves out as models of best practices have been 
shown to have had deeply flawed macroeconomic policies and institutions and to 
have suffered from major shortfalls in transparency.” 
 
In this paper, I discuss the problems of creating and expanding national 
macroeconomic policy space and economic  governance within a framework of overall 
global and regional financial architectures. The context of global financial and economic 
crisis gives such an exercise an undeniable  urgency.  However, the theoretical approach  
towards  a type of constructivist analysis which respects the structural complexities of a 
global real-financial economy with serious asymmetries, problems of managing risk and 
uncertainty and uneven development may have broader applicability beyond the current 
crisis.  Whether state capacities exist for formulation and implementation of national 
economic policies may depend in large measure on the kind of global and regional 
financial architecture in existence at any point in time---with or without financial crises.. 
 The methodological approach adopted here is a type of constructivist and 
evolutionary analysis of international political economy.  The institutions I discuss and 
the alternatives I propose are all path dependent, but in a non-deterministic manner . 
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Social practices based on collectively held ideas by both elite and non-elite groups can 
matter in crucial ways. However, given the structural aspects of global capitalism and the 
conflicting ideas and norms, there are serious contradictions at all levels of the system. 
Recognition of such contradictions and conflicts at both ideational and material levels 
dialectically forms the “critical” part of my constructivist approach(Khan 2004,2006).1  
The social and political construction of global and regional financial arrangements 
also depends critically on a supporting structure of complementary institutional 
network(CIN), norms, ideas and practices. Global financial architecture(GFA) and 
Regional financial architecture(RFA) both depend on their respective CIN within a global 
system of nation states and international organizations. Given the real interdependence 
within the system, all actors have some stake in sustained growth and stability with 
equity. At the same time part of the complexity of the global financial system arises from 
various contradictions and asymmetries in the system itself. Thus the central argument of 
this paper is that sustainable policies at the national level require a supporting network of 
GFA and RFAs that go some distance towards resolving the key issues arising from such 
contradictions and asymmetries. Appropriate national policies in their turn can contribute 
to the sustainability of the GFA and RFA. It can be shown that following an evolutionary 
theory of international financial institutions, two broad  types of possible Global 
Financial Architectures can be identified.2 In this paper, following Khan(2002c) the first 
is called an overarching type, exemplified by the classical gold standard and the defunct 
Bretton Woods system. The second is called a hybrid form that allows for the existence 
and coevolution of some Regional Financial Architectures as well. The changing roles of 
the IMF and national economic policies can be examined within these two possible 
financial architectures under globalization. The ongoing politics of re/construction of 
IMF along a more functional and equitable line is and will remain complex and require a 
                                                
1 At the same time corporate actors are legitimate under some conditions. In this my analysis is similar to 
Wendt’s(1987, 1999)  constructivist approach which does not contradict a deep and sophisticated version of 
Scientific Realism. Indeed, both Wendt and I build upon a scientific realist ontology avoiding narrow 
determinism. See also Wade(2009a,b;2008a,b,c,d),Khan ( 2001, 2002a-c; 2003a,b;2004;2006;2008a-c; 
2008c), Best(2010) and Abdelal(2007). 
2 For specific models and arguments see those developed in Khan(2001, 2002c,2004 and 2006) and Khan 
et. al.(2008). Khan(2001;2006) formalizes various types of path dependence. In Khan(2002c) a specific 
argument called “the extended panda’s thumb”  is advanced to urge the utilization of the existing IMF with 
some modifications in a new, hybrid GFA.See also Desai and Vreeland(2011). 
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separate treatment. But some analytical remarks along these lines along with the concrete 
constructivist evolutionary model presented in this paper can underline the challenges 
and opportunities for making progress towards effective  and equitable global economic 
governance. 
The role of structural unevenness in the global economy is particularly important to 
recognize within the proposed framework of analysis. The range of economies, the types 
of polities, the institutional capacities and resource endowments including technological 
progress and capacities for innovation  all vary widely. A simple system of gold standard 
or adjustable peg or free and flexible exchange rate together with free multilateral trade 
under, say, the WTO arrangement may therefore be simplistic. It may serve the needs of 
one group of actors, for example, the financial elites within the advanced economies with 
well-developed financial services sectors, than  some others, even within the advanced 
economies. How best to achieve a synchronized growth and development regime that is 
perceived to be fair by all is indeed a challenging problem.  The GFA is defined here as a 
system of global financial arrangements for international payments with specific rules 
and procedures for the member nations to follow. If there exists a similar institutional 
arrangement at the supranational but regional level only then I call it an RFA. It will be 
seen that one attractive solution to the problem of global unevenness is to design a  GFA 
which also includes a number of RFAs as an integral part of the global financial system. 
 
    An important initial distinction also needs to be made between crisis management and 
crisis prevention  tasks of GFA and RFAs. Of course, prevention, as the old bromide 
goes, is better than cure. Therefore, the GFA and RFAs are to be judged optimal in the 
sense of achieving  the highest probability of prevention subject to the constraints of the 
system. However, it is not clear that the best GFA and RFAs from this perspective are 
also the best in promoting growth or  managing crisis. For example at one extreme, an 
autarchic system may never have a crisis, but may not promote much growth. If there is a 
crisis because of domestic moral hazards and adverse selection problems, it may be 
difficult to manage because capabilities do not exist for crisis management under the 
assumption that these crises are rare events.But there could be GFAs and RFAs that can 
potentially develop the capacity for both better crisis management and crisis prevention. 
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In a world of bounded rationality and institutional uncertainty, there may be considerable 
room for improvement along both the dimensions in an evolutionary sense. However, in 
such a world the application of the pragmatic principle of prudence would support the 
development of crisis management capacities at all times, since it will be difficult to 
prevent crises entirely under any type of open economy GFA and RFAs. The main goals, 
pragmatically speaking, are to  minimize financial and economic instabilities while 
facilitating global payments, trade and investments. 
 
2. Globalization, Financialization and the Role of Global Capital markets  
 
Globalization of financial markets has increased the flow of various types of capital 
across the borders. Observers have cautioned about the adverse effects on market . 
stability Indeed, even as marketization of finance across borders proceeds rapidly 
substantial instability is manifest in the global financial markets. As resistance to further 
marketization without regulation grows, the instabilities are likely to spread and result 
also in political and social instabilities as well.3 For this reason alone, it may be wise to 
adopt a new and more pragmatic approach to GFA  that can help policy making for 
greater well-being in the nations of the world. As mentioned before, this will help prevent 
a third type of crisis: a political and social crisis. The developments in Indonesia during 
the AFC, and the cases of Iceland and Greece more recently illustrate how suddenly such 
crises can break out(Khan2004, 2008a,b). The sub-prime crisis merely confirms the 
theoretical likelihood of such emergence in an unregulated environment which a complex 
system theory developed in Khan(2004, Lin, Khan et. al.2008) helps one to recognize. 
The evolutionary theory of GFA developed here actually suggests a pragmatic path-
dependent institution-building approach to a hybrid GFA. But the political economic 
process is likely to be quite complex. 
 
                                                
3 See Polanyi(1944) for a classic discussion of marketization of money, labor and land, and the resulting 
resistance that he calls”the double movement”. 
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 It is because of such complexities that the term ‘globalization’ which is so much in 
vogue today has to be used with caution.4 When viewed historically, it appears that 
globalization is a contradictory process of international economic integration that was 
severely interrupted by the first world war, the great depression, and the second world 
war. The emergence of the Bretton Woods framework can be seen as a way to integrate 
the world with respect to trade while controlling the flow of private capital. The demise 
of Bretton Woods has set in motion forces of capital account liberalization that are often 
the most visible aspects of ‘globalization’. However, even this process is fraught with 
new instabilities as evidenced by the Mexican and — more recently and even more 
dramatically — by the Asian financial crisis. At the same time integration of trade even 
within the standard neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model would imply a fall in 
the wages of unskilled workers of the north thus increasing inequality there (Krugman, 
1996; Wood, 1994). The south is supposed to experience a more equalizing effect 
through trade; but empirically, there is very little evidence of this happening. Therefore, it 
is necessary to treat the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are 
experiencing a `fractured’ globalization . Integration of financial markets, for example, 
can lead to great benefits for all in a truly liberal world of equal actors. However, in a 
world of unevenness the evolutionary paths may lead to crisis unless institutions are 
designed properly. Leaving everything to the markets may produce the supreme irony of 
ultimately leading to crises which prevent some very important capital and commodity 
markets from functioning. 
 
For these reasons, it is best to ask what roles the global capital markets are supposed 
to perform in a world of free capital mobility. The functions are variously described, but 
mainly emphasize the transfer of resources from savers to investors globally. In addition, 
the agglomeration of capital, selection of projects, monitoring, contract enforcement, risk 
sharing and pooling of risks  are also mentioned. All these are legitimate functions of 
capital markets. However, despite much talk the crucial problem of handling various 
kinds of risks and the inability of simple free markets with international capital mobility 
are nearly always elided. What are some of the most important of these risks? 
                                                
4 See Khan(2008a, b) for a careful definition of the complex and fractured globalization as a concept. 
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Exchange rate risk refers to the possibility that a country’s currency may experience a 
precipitous decline in value. This risk is present in any type of exchange rate regime, with 
full or even partial currency convertibility. Both floating exchange rates  and   pegging a 
currency to another single currency, or even a basket of currencies present such exchange 
rate risk to various degrees. 
 
    Capital flight risk refers to the possibility that both domestic and foreign holders of 
financial assets will sell their holdings whenever there is an expectation of a capital loss.  
Exchange rate risk is one possible avenue through which such expectations may be 
formed. As with many types of expectations formation mechanisms, in a world of 
nonlinearity, bounded rationality and uncertainty, a Keynesian type of short termism 
takes over. Investors head for the  simply on the basis of short term calculations of 
possible loss, and herd behavior is a likely outcome. Financial distress follows for the 
hapless country from which capital thus exits in a hurry. In the extreme situation of large 
short term liabilities, the affected economy may land in a full-blown financial, or even 
economic crisis. 
 
There is thus a systemic risk of financial fragility associated with the above risks, and 
the stability of the financial and political institutions.This type of systemic risk raises the 
possibility of a financial meltdown.In case of AFC, the risk of financial fragility 
increased over the 90s through maturity mismatch of loans. The fact that many of the 
short-term loans were in foreign currencies without risk-sharing mechanisms such as 
currency swaps in place, created further exchange rate risk which also increased the 
potential systemic risk. This is consistent with the view of Knight (1998) who affirms 
that although globalization has brought about spectacular increase in the flow of capital 
to emerging markets, the Asian financial crisis demonstrates that it can also create 
financial instability and contagion.  Under fairly realistic conditions the banking system 
of emerging economies can respond in ways that worsen the impact of adverse shocks, 
causing severe macroeconomic repercussions and  exacerbating systemic financial and 
economic fragility..  
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 In the case of AFC in the late 1990s and the global crisis in the 21st century, we also 
witnessed a fourth kind of risk for vulnerable economies that  others5 have also 
recognized. This is the risk of contagion.6Some countries were unnecessarily victimized 
simply because expectations moved against their economic prospects as their neighbors 
experienced financial fragility and capital flight. This has important implications for both 
global and regional financial architecture. Both GFA and RFAs should try to minimize 
the contagion risk. Contagion can happen even without much financial and trade 
openness. However, the more integrated with the rest of the world, or even a region, an 
economy is, the more is the risk of contagion. There is some theoretical  support for this 
last proposition in specific markets that are being globalized. For example,  some7 argued 
after the AFC that the globalization of securities markets can promote contagion among 
investors by weakening incentives of gathering costly country-specific information 
because the marginal benefit of gathering information may be decreasing as securities 
markets become more global in scope. This seems to have been confirmed during the 
contagion which in fact produced the recent global crisis. 
 
The key problem which underlies the above risk scenarios, long recognized by the 
practitioners before theorists started to study it, is that given informational problems and 
cost of building enforcing institutions, capital markets are almost always incomplete and 
contain crucial asymmetries. Thus classical theorems of welfare economics no longer 
apply even within a closed economy. In a world of open economies these problems 
become more severe, and are directly related to the lack of global institutions of 
governance. The recognition of this point underlies the various proposals advanced so far. 
There are already many proposals8 for GFAs on the table. Even a partial cataloguing will 
have to include the many national proposals(e.g., US, UK, French and Canadian 
proposals), private proposals such as Soros’ credit insurance agency,Edward’s 
                                                
5 See for example, Knight(1998). 
6 Of course, the risk of contagion is always present whenever a financial crisis breaks out. Whether actual 
contagion is observed depends on a number of factors including the domestic economy’s ability to fight off 
speculative attacks. 
7 See for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1999). Khan(2004) 
8 As Eichengreen (1999) documents, these range from individuals to national to international agendas. 
 10 
specialized agencies, Bergsten’s target zones etc., and other international proposals. 
Among the international proposals could be included the IMF proposals,G-7 and G-22 
proposals.Although they vary in scope and degrees of political realism, they share one 
feature in common.All of them fall into the overarching type of GFA category. 
      Although many of the proposals for GFA  are possible theoretical solutions the 
evolutionary approach looks at path dependence and sequential selection processes as 
crucial. From the critical constructive perspective, we need to recognize that the actual 
evolution of such institutions of financial governance will depend crucially on the 
coordination among the actors, in particular among some key actors in the global system 
which is contradictory and conflict laden at all levels. This leads us to the consideration 
of the specificities of the proposed theory. 
 
3. A Constructive  Evolutionary Theory(CET) of GFA  : two evolutionary types 
of GFA---AFC as a Critical Case for  a CET of GFA 
 
 
In order to motivate the discussion we can return to some aspects of AFC.  In 
distinguishing among the countries that managed to survive the AFC and those that did 
not, John Williamson , one of the proponents of the “Washington consensus,” pointed out 
that whether or not these countries had liberalized their capital accounts could be 
construed as crucial. Those that had not, survived.9  
 
All Asian crisis countries  had accepted the IMF’s Article VIII obligations, as evident 
from the historical documents. But as some10 have pointed out, liberalizing trade and 
liberalizing financial sector have different policy implications. In line with the discussion 
in the previous section,. theoretically, one should  carefully distinguish the welfare 
impacts of financial market liberalization in an uneven world from such impact in a 
smooth world of equals with information symmetry. Indeed, next to unevenness,. the 
most critical element is the role and the presence of asymmetric information. In a 
                                                
9  John Williamson (1998), passim. 
10 See for example, Bhagwati(1998). 
 11 
financial market,  gathering, selecting, using and providing information are central to its 
proper functioning, yet it is precisely here that market failures from asymmetric 
information can arise. 11 
But the constructive evolutionary theory with appropriate attention to structure goes 
further than simply cataloguing moral hazard and adverse selection problems. On the 
explanans side are also the asymmetries in the size, structure and capabilities of the 
economies and polities. These asymmetries constrain some polities, particularly the 
economically disadvantaged ones from developing as quickly as possible in an equitable 
manner. The UNCTAD reports on the poorest underdeveloped countries points this out 
empirically.12 The theoretical significance of these features of the real world is that no 
uniform set of rules can work for all the economies and polities in the world. A fortiori, it 
follows that for GFA and RFAs to serve these poor countries as well as the rich countries 
equally well, special provisions should be in place. 
 
It may appear that the least developed countries are only a special case. But that is not 
the case. The NIEs, the European social democracies, Japan etc. each in its own way is 
also different. This poses the real theoretical challenge: how can we even attempt to 
theorize in the face of such diversity? The way out is through a consideration of the basic 
needs of the system and asking if these can be satisfied better under arrangements that are 
different from the IMF and the “Washington Consensus.” 
Further  work by Barry Eichengreen and others13  show that it is possible to move 
beyond the post Bretton Woods situation. In contrast with the conservative Meltzer 
                                                
11 Stiglitz has been one of the pioneers of  such “information theoretic” approach. For further analysis, see 
Stiglitz(1994). 
12 See UNCTAD(2002,2003 2007). 
13 See in addition to Eichengreen (1999) cited earlier,Azis, Iwan J (1999) Do We Know 
the Real Causes of the Asian Crisis? Global Financial Turmoil and Reform: A United 
Nations Perspective, The United Nations University Press, Tokyo. 
Khan, Haider A. 2004 Global Markets and Financial Crisis: Towards a New Theory for the 
21st Century  Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., A. Tornell., A.Velasco. (1996) Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: 
The Lessons From 1995, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No 1. 
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report, all of these authors emphasize the need to strengthen the IMF in certain 
dimensions. However, not all of them recognize the crucial need also for the RFAs and 
the role they can play in creating an enabling environment for the state to implement 
beneficial economic policies. A  completely constructive evolutionary theory of GFA 
recognizes the need for RFAs from both an evolutionary and a structural perspective. 
Given the lack of political resolve, a point made forcefully by Eichengreen among others, 
there is little chance of creating institutional structures in the manner of the 1944 Bretton 
Woods agreement. The recent path of the world economy does not lead to this 
immediately. At the same time, the recent path does not lead to only neoliberalism. It is 
possible to both reform the IMF, as Eichengreen suggests, and to create new RFAs to 
complement such reforms. Thus this theory leads to the question of  identifying a 
spectrum of GFAs. Most important among these are those that combine the GFAs like a 
reformed IMF with appropriate RFAs. 
 
Formally, the heuristic argument presented above can be established via a careful 
consideration of path dependence during evolution of the GFA. In order to do this in a 
conceptually rigorous manner, the concept of path dependence itself has to be refined and 
formalized in a specific way. I have developed this idea elsewhere, and will only sketch 
the conceptual path to be followed briefly.14 Briefly, there can be completely 
                                                                                                                                            
Sachs, Jeffrey D, and Wing Thye Woo (2000). Understanding the Asian Financial Crisis, 
in Woo, Wing Thye, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Klaus Schwab (eds), The Asian Financial 
Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia, The MIT Press. 
Summers, Lawrence H (2000). International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and 
Cures, American Economic Review, Vol 90, No.2. 
 
Tobin, James., and Gustav Ranis (1998). The IMF’s Misplaced Priorities: Flawed Funds, 
The New Republic, available online at the following address: 
http://www.thenewrepublic.com/archive/0398/030998/tobin030998.html 
 
Yoshitomi, Masaru and Kenichi Ohno (1999), "Capital Account Crisis and Credit 
Contraction: Towards a Better Management of Systemic Currency Crisis", Paper 
presented at ADB Annual Meeting, 29 April 1999, Manila 
 
 
 
14 See Khan (2001 and 2002c) 
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deterministic(CD), completely stochastic(CS), and partially deterministic 
(PD)characterizations of path dependence. Eschewing the formal apparatus of graph 
theory and neural network dynamics which can be used to describe these rigorously, we 
can simply say that in deterministic path dependence there is only one choice of path. 
Everything is as it should be, since there are no bifurcations at any point in history. In 
fact, we can make a stronger statement. At no point in history is there even a possibility 
of even a bifurcation. Most people will see this as an extreme, and in case of human 
institutional design, perhaps as an unrealistic case. 
The purely stochastic case is all random mutation.Again, there is no way that 
conscious choice can play a role here either. Blind chance determines the outcome. The 
last type of path dependence, i.e., the PD variety leaves some room for evolution to be a 
result of  at least some kind of boundedly rational human activities. In  this case, a 
complex set of human activities including learning and improving policy making 
capabilities can influence which network of paths are followed over time. While the 
number of available paths at any point in history may be large, they are never infinite. 
Therefore, combinatorial mathematics will in most cases show the existence of the most 
likely evolutionary outcome. However, the caveat that large, seemingly  random 
fluctuations(e.g., a war) can throw these calculations off is always a (rare) possibility. 
Fortunately, barring such events as wars, revolutions, complete meltdowns of 
financial systems etc. there are not at present an unmanageably large number of outcomes 
that are possible for the GFA. In fact, if we are willing to assume a continuum with 
nothing but an overarching global   architecture for international finance with regional 
impurities added as another type we have just two types of possible evolutionary 
outcomes for the institutional history of GFAs from a theoretical point of view. 
 
 The first type, which can be created at special evolutionary moments can be called 
Overarching GFAs. Gold standard under the UK hegemony and Bretton Woods under the 
threats of a postwar depression are two examples. Recent history does not support the 
hope that such events are about to happen again. Therefore, a second type of evolutionary 
path resulting in a hybrid form should be recognized. This is the hybrid coexistence of a 
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GFA together with one or many RFAs. We can call this type a hybrid GFA for shorthand 
reference. Once again, Asia after the AFC is a good place to begin the analysis. 
 
 In the Asian  case, as many have observed, the financial sector liberalization 
followed the pre-AFC neo-liberal GFA by default. There were some short-term gains of 
the policy , but ultimately it resulted in severe instability. More generally, as  Kaminsky 
& Reinhart 15 show, based on the episodes of 76 currency crises, of which 26 are also 
characterized by banking crises,  financial sector liberalization can result in a boom-bust 
cycle by providing easy access to short-term financing. Proponents of liberalization  
suggest some sort of micro sequencing in order to prevent such adverse consequences.. 
With some variations,the most commonly suggested sequence is: improve the quality of 
regulation, make sure they are enforced, and then improve the supervisory mechanisms. 
Once the markets are liberalized, the level of bank’s minimum capital requirements can 
be brought closer to what the Basle Accord requires.  
 As one author 16 who, of course, does not use the same terminology as developed 
here, nevertheless  points out, there is a contradiction in this type of GFA arrangement. 
But when the Asian crisis countries liberalized the financial sector in 1980s, the 
aforementioned preconditions (assumptions) were not in place. Yet, they were rushed to 
liberalize by the IFI. Ironically, when at the early stage the policy showed favorable 
impacts, e.g., higher economic growth, greater access to financial services, the IFI 
applauded it. But when the crisis hit, the very same countries previously praised were 
swiftly placed into the category of those with misplaced development strategies. All of a 
sudden, nothing was right with these countries. When confronted with such an 
embarrassing contradiction, the international institutions are quick to claim that they 
actually saw the faults, and already reminded the governments about the existing flaws 
(e.g., weak banking system, unsustainable exchange rate system, and widespread 
corruption).17  
 
                                                
15 See Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999). 
16  Azis( 2002c). 
17 Azis(2002c) p.3 
 15 
 IMF recommendation during this period led to the increase in  interest rates. Because 
of the common prescription under the GFA this occurred in all Asian crisis countries. 
Such high rates created more moral hazard and adverse selection problems, thus showing 
that  the incentive system has indeed been altered, and led to the undertaking of bad risk 
by the banking sector18. As Azis correctly points out: 
Under these circumstances, the amount of investment credits going to risky sector rose (adverse 
selection), the incidence of bail out in the absence of free-exit scheme also increased (moral hazard), and 
the subsequent banks’ franchise values (expected returns) declined. All these are precisely what the “pre-
conditions prior to liberalization” are expected to avoid. Thus, the implicit logic is inherently self-
conflicting, i.e., expecting bank’s prudent behavior while allowing ‘franchise value’ to fall. The suggested 
preconditions, although seemingly logical, simply do not match with the prevailing institutional 
conditions.19  
 
 Azis points out further: 
The IMF persistently argued for liberalizing the sector and meeting the pre-conditions simultaneously. 
A study by the Fund on the sequencing of capital account liberalization using the case of Chile, Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand, for example, stresses the importance of proper sequencing if benefits from the 
liberalization are to be achieved and the risks to be minimized. The study also argues that financial sector 
liberalization, especially capital account liberalization, should be a part of a coordinated and comprehensive 
approach, in which the sequencing of regulatory and institutional reforms is critical. The design of 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies should also play a vital role (Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverria, 
1997). While intuitively making sense, such conclusions are too broad, far from being practical. No one 
would argue against the importance of making liberalization policy (or any policy for that matter) 
consistent with the prevailing macroeconomic policy. But how do you do it, remains unanswered. The 
information contained in such a study is of limited value to policy makers. Yet, while many countries still 
had problems to meet the stated preconditions, they were pushed to accelerate the liberalization policy by 
recommending one or two new measures to safeguard. More often than not, these measures are based on 
the practice of developed countries that have different institutional conditions.(emphasis mine)20 
 
Here the author correctly pinpoints the failure to recognize unevenness as a key 
feature of the failure of the IMF to prescribe the correct medicine. In fact, IMF did much 
worse--- it prescribed the wrong medicine, a set of measures that worsened the impact of 
                                                
18 See Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz ( 2000) 
19 Azis(2002c) p.3 
20 Azis(2002c)pp.3-4 
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the AFC. This situation illustrates the danger of being in the grip of a (pseudo-) 
universalistic theory that simply cannot be applied in the real world of unevenness 
without serious distortions that may cause great harm. An alternative is to work with our 
type two hybrid combination of GFA and RFAs. Again, Asia can be used as an 
illustration.  
 17 
Prior to AFC,  the borrowing in short-term market and the increased flow of foreign 
capital both occurred almost simultaneously in these countries. As the real exchange rate 
appreciated, competitiveness suffered, and vulnerability to sudden reversals of capital 
flows increased. It must be emphasized that these were systemic features that went 
largely unnoticed by the IMF or the private sector. As  is well known, in a nonlinear 
system the vulnerability to sudden shocks is a logical possibility. In case of Asia, this 
became an empirical reality of nightmare proportions. 
 
     With most debtors  being in the  corporate sector during the AFC, the capacity to 
invest became severely constrained. The debt-deflation scenario became the reality 
because the price effects of depreciated exchange rates did not occur until much later, if 
at all. Hence, the initial currency crisis became first a more general financial crisis and 
then a full-blown economic crisis. In Indonesia it also became a social and political crisis 
The Asian crisis showed that, the composition of capital flows matters. The fact that 
there were sudden reversals of capital flows during 1997 and 1998 led many to believe 
that most capital flows in the region were of portfolio investment type. Reversals of such 
capital can strain the region’s financial system sufficiently to cause or exacerbate its 
collapse 21. However, while it is true that portfolio investment was on the rise, data 
indicate that foreign direct investment (FDI) remained the largest in all Asian crisis 
countries. In all Asian crisis countries foreign debts increased persistently until the onset 
of the crisis. These were debts of the private sector from foreign private lenders.Regional 
monitoring with the help of a theory such as the one proposed here could have caught the 
problem and a regionally, ultimately globally, coordinated solution could be attempted. 
But this was never a possibility under the then existing circumstances. We now know that 
financial and balance-of-payments crises became interlinked precisely because of the 
existence of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities (foreign debt) in the domestic 
financial system 22. This hindsight can be used to develop RFAs in Asia, Latin America 
and a few other regions. 
 
                                                
21 See for example,Rodrik and Velasco ( 1999) 
22 See Krueger ( 2000) 
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In Asia, a “Washington Consensus” policy mix of monetary tightening and fiscal 
restraints was imposed as part of the IMF conditionalities. The experience during  the 
Mexican crisis in 1995 had convinced the Fund that such a policy mix was appropriate 
for Asia as well, despite the fact that the pre-crisis conditions in Asia were quite 
otherwise.23 Another element emerged in Asia that was indeed new.The IMF suggested a 
rather radical and fundamental change in the countries’ institutional structure. 24.In the 
event, neither set turned out to have been well-conceived. 
 
As already observed,. the Fund’s insistence on severely tightening the monetary 
policy by raising the interest rates turned out to be incorrect and  counterproductive. Its 
arguments for remaking many institutions in Asia did not make evolutionary sense 
although all would  agree that ending corruption, curtailing special business privileges, 
and imposing the practice of good governance, including good corporate governance 
were good overall goals.25  But quite apart from the wellknown fact that this falls outside 
the Fund’s mandate, such adjustments at the time could result in further instability. In the 
words of  Morris Goldstein, an ex-IMF staff member: “………both the scope and the 
depth of the Fund’s conditions were excessive…..They clearly strayed outside their area 
of expertise……If a nation is so plagued with problems that it needs to make 140 changes 
before it can borrow, then maybe the fund should not lend.” 26. Although not a conscious 
advocate of the evolutionary theory advanced here, Goldstein’s long experience and solid 
sense of institutional matters led him to the right conclusions in this matter. 
 
                                                
23  James Tobin and Gustav Ranis(1998) were among those who believed that the IMF programs in Asia 
were based on the Fund’s experiences with Mexico in 1994. 
24 Azis(2002c) suggests: ‘The experience with policy adjustments of this kind in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (from communism to market economy) had inspired the Fund to do the same thing in 
Asia.’ (p.7) 
25 See Khan(1999a, b; and 2001) on Asian corporate governance reform, and the sketch of an evolutionary 
theory. 
26 New York Times, October 21, 2000.  
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Before leaving the question of the analytical distinction between the two types of 
GFAs it is instructive to ask whether the theory of the second best is relevant in making 
this distinction. Although the language of evolutionary theory is different, this can be 
done in away that throws further light on why the hybrid form is important. In a first best 
world without frictions, information problems and market imperfections an overarching 
GFA is indeed optimal. However once we depart from any of these we are in the second 
best world. Interestingly, given these imperfections, at least along some dimensions, a 
hybrid architecture with RFAs can (locally) improve upon the surveillance problems that 
an overarching GFA will face. As long as local information gathering and monitoring can 
be improved under a (local) RFA, there is an advantage to having an RFA. In the world 
of second best this can be called “the principle of localism”.27 
 
4.  Towards a Workable Hybrid GFA: RFAs, the IMF and National Policy 
Management under  Fractured Globalization: 
 
  But how is the transition towards a hybrid GFA to be effected? What conceptual 
modifications are necessary in the way to which we have become accustomed to thinking 
under the present institutional order? The present and following sections are all intended 
to answer these questions. The present section will consider steps taken by the IMF 
during the global crisis and some general issues and the possible formation of RFAs 
stemming from the AFC and the current crisis, while sections five and six will address 
more rigorously how the IMF needs to be modified and what such a modified IMF 
together with several  RFAs could do. I do this strategically by discussing the 
counterfactual of what a hypothetical RFA in Asia could have done to handle the 
situation before, during and after the AFC. This turns out to have broader applicability in 
the 21st century global crisis management. But in order to build the argument for a hybrid 
GFA fully,   first the recent tentative but potentially important reformist steps of the IMF 
deserve consideration.  
The IMF’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis and its Evolving Role 
Loss of Stature after the Asian financial crisis 
                                                
27 I am grateful to Barbara Stallings for  very helpful discussion on this point. 
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After the Asian financial crisis, the Fund lost much of its credibility with developing 
countries. As a result, the Fund’s program portfolio diminished significantly for much of 
the last decade. Prior to the most recent crisis, demand for the Fund’s resources was at an 
historic low. Major borrowers had repaid their outstanding debt to at the time of the most 
recent crisis, leading the Fund to contract its staff by around 15% [Grabel 2010, 3; Kapur 
and Webb 2006; Thomas 2009]. The Fund’s loan portfolio shrunk from $105 billion to 
less than $10 billion in the space of five years (2003-2007) [Weisbrot, Cordero and 
Sandoval 2009].  
Many have pointed to the Fund’s continued insistence on using ex ante and ex post 
conditionality as a major reason as to why countries shied away from going to the 
institution for help. The historical use of conditionality within IMF programs meant that 
developing countries had to acquiesce to dominant Western thinking on correct fiscal and 
monetary policy formulae. Embarrassment at having to ask the IMF for assistance during 
crises also played an important role in dissuading developing countries from ceding 
control over their fiscal and monetary policy over to the Fund. Over the past decade or so, 
developing countries were able to resist relying upon the IMF through: 
• The over-accumulation of reserves 
• International private capital flows 
• Bilateral swap arrangements 
• Regional banks and financial arrangements 
• South-South financial assistance. 
 
Regaining Relevance 
In December of 2008, the IMF was thrust into the global financial crisis through its 
stand-by arrangement with Iceland.  The Fund package with Iceland totaled $2.1 billion, 
with over $800 million made available immediately for the country [Anderson 2008].  
IMF policy prescription was used to explicitly stem the fall of the Icelandic krona to ward 
off the potential of massive defaults in foreign denominated currency. Monetary and 
fiscal policy space was left largely open by the Fund. The IMF also provided assistance 
in the restructuring of the entire Icelandic banking and financial structure.  
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Since providing assistance to Iceland, the Fund has been very active in providing 
financial assistance to member states all over the globe. Notably, the global nature of 
crisis has meant the Fund is being seen in areas of the world (most especially Europe) for 
the first time in quite a while. With that said, the majority IMF’s response to the crisis 
was built around a sharp increase in the amount of concessional lending to low- and 
middle-income countries.  
Lending to low-income countries during the crisis period was 4 fold larger than 
historical levels [IMF 2009]. In late 2009, concessional resources for low-income 
countries to meet projected demand was increased to nearly $17 billion through 2014 
[IMF 2009].  Relief on interest payments by LICs to the IMF through 2011 has been 
approved. Additionally, LICs now can access double normal limits on annualized draw-
outs from the Fund. The IMF approved a $250 billion allocation of SDRs that will be 
distributed to all of the member countries at the Fund according to their quota levels. As 
such, more than $18 billion will be available to LICs to augment their foreign exchange 
reserves to alleviate financing and BOP constraints [IMF 2009]. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Fund has become relevant again.It is 
also trying to regain credibility in global financial governance---an effort that actually 
started with the AFC(Khan 2002c, 2004, 2006; Best 2010). It has served as a “first 
responder” to financial crises in countries throughout the globe [Grabel 2010, 3].  The 
restoration of the Fund to its ‘proper place’ in the international financial system was seen 
in its speedy response to the Icelandic crisis and from the boost it received from G-20 
nations. Indeed, the G-20 meeting in April 2009 reaffirmed the Fund’s mandate and 
provided new and large amounts of funding commitments ($1.1 trillion for the crisis; 
$750 billion through the IMF) to support the institution’s efforts [Grabel 2010, 3]. Even 
China and Brazil, notable critics of the Fund’s governance policies, committed new 
resources and lending to the institution. These new commitments will facilitate greater 
interaction and sharing of resources between the IMF and regional development banks.  
The G-20 has backed the partial devolution of funding commitments from the IMF to 
regional development banks to allow resources to be available in a more timely fashion to 
countries in need. This kind of development speaks to a small, but growing, consensus 
that the IMF might be better served in the future to serve as a central figure in a network 
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of intergovernmental finance with regional development banks and institutions [Vols and 
Caliari 2010]. 
In 2009, the IMF also began issuing its own bonds to boost its available resources. 
$90 billion of the $500 billion in new resources for future IMF lending will come from 
BRIC countries and South Korea [Grabel 2010, 4]. The development is important in two 
ways:  
1. Lenders from emerging and developing markets can use their new lending 
capacity to exert greater influence over policies of the Fund. 
2. Buoyed by new commitments from the BRIC reaffirms the central role the Fund 
will continue to play as a lender of last resort. 
 
 
Current Arrangements 
As of January, 2011, the Fund had 19 Stand-by Arrangements with different 
member countries. These arrangements involved the potential draw-out of over 70 SDR 
billion, of which nearly 35 SDR billion had already been delivered. These arrangements 
included  member states from Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, Central America, Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. The Fund also had four extended arrangements 
with member states, with nearly 20 SDR billion in resources were being utilized through 
these facilities. Three countries (Colombia, Mexico and Poland) had already begun taking 
advantage of the IMF’s new Flexible Credit Line facility. These three arrangements had 
already seen nearly 48 SDR billion in BOP assistance being given out by the Fund. The 
above arrangements, totaling over 125 SDR billion, were all relatively recent; all of these 
facilities were initiated in the last three years [IMF Financial Activities Update 2011]. 
In addition, the Fund as of February 2011 had 28 Extended Credit Facility 
Arrangements on its books. The value of these arrangements was around 2.5 SDR billion, 
a billion of which had already been drawn upon. Over the past decade, the Fund had 
committed over 6 SDR billion in debt relief through its Heavily-Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) programs. These programs had 
involved arrangements with over 60 countries [IMF Financial Activities Update 2011]. 
Changes to the IMF’s conditionality regimes 
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In the wake of the global crisis, the IMF has introduced a number of new financial 
programs aimed at allowing countries to have more agency in delineating their 
loan/policy structures. The IMF has stated that these facilities “will be more flexible and 
tailored to the increasing diversity” of member countries [IMF 2009]. New instruments 
include: 
• Extended Credit Facility – medium-term support and flexibility program 
• Standby Credit Facility – addresses short-term and precautionary needs 
• Rapid Credit Facility – emergency support with limited conditionality 
• Flexible Credit Line – support for BOP pressures for countries with strong 
macroeconomic track records; no ex post conditionality [IMF 2010d] 
• Precautionary Credit Line –  lower standards of qualification than for the FCL; 
less ex ante qualifications, but stronger ex post conditionality 
Each facility and credit line has its own conditions, term structures, borrowing capacity 
and availability. The IMF has strongly pushed to make its credit facilities more low-cost 
for member economies. Conditionality is being streamlined to “focus on core objectives” 
[IMF 2009], and applies primarily to structural reforms. Conditionality is not supposed to 
affect countries’ fiscal policies that directly target poverty alleviation, growth and pro-
poor spending. Programs now are supposed to accommodate larger fiscal deficits, looser 
monetary policy and increased inflation targets. Additionally, countries will not need to 
seek waivers for access to funds if reforms are not completed by a specific date. 
In addition to paying lip service towards granting more policy autonomy to 
countries with IMF facilities, the Fund has softened its stance on capital controls and 
other macro-prudential measures [see, Ostry, et. al 2010]. The Fund, and its sister 
organization the World Bank, have indicated that the targeted and temporary use of 
capital controls can be an effective way for countries to defend themselves against 
exogenous financial shocks and preserve monetary policy space [Beattie 2010; Ostry, et. 
al 2010]. This is a far cry from the Fund’s reaction to the controls put into place by 
Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis. As part of the Iceland’s 2008 Stand By 
Agreement(SBA), the IMF explicitly advocated the use of such controls [Anderson 
2008]. Nonetheless, one of the Fund’s most recent papers on economic liberalization 
[Shah and Patnaik, 2011] indicts the use of controls in India for their ineffectiveness in 
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shielding the economy from exogenous shocks and their bias against small- and medium-
sized private firms. 
 In reality, a close study of conditionality ‘reforms’ confirms that they are more 
ad hoc and piecemeal than might otherwise appear. Many of the recent studies of SBAs 
and other facilities negotiated during the crisis have shown that the IMF has continued to 
promote pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy targets or structural adjustments [UNICEF, 
2010; Van Waeyenberge, Bargawi and McKinley, 2010; Muchhala, 2009; Solidar, 2009; 
Weisbrot et al., 2009].  Questions have already arisen as to what fiscal programs count as 
targeting ‘poverty alleviation, growth and pro-poor spending’. Does the subsidizing of 
basic energy inputs for the poor (kerosene, heating oil, etc.) count under these spending 
exceptions? The evidence emanating from the IMF is mixed at best. Public outcries in 
Pakistan and the Kyrgyz Republic over the ending of energy input subsidies are 
important examples of how IMF policy prescription can directly lead to public unrest. In 
the midst of the crisis, the Hungarian government’s public spat with the IMF over 
program conditionality was especially notable, illustrating the unease within governments 
to work under the Fund’s rules [Bryant 2010]. 
Governance Reforms at the IMF  
The IMF has recently seen a change in the share of voting quotas. In November 
and December of 2010, IMF member countries agreed to an unprecedented doubling of 
quotas to SDR 476.8 billion [IMF 2010a]. This doubling of quotas was complemented 
with changes in the quota shares amongst the members. As a result, more than 6 percent 
of quota shares will be shifted to “emerging market and developing countries” and away 
from over-represented European countries. The shifting of shares will not impact the 
voting power of the Fund’s poorest members. Starting from 2012, the Fund’s 10 largest 
contributors and quota shareholders will more accurately reflect the countries’ 
contributions to world GDP. The total shift in voting share to developing countries, when 
combined with the 2008 quota reform, will be 5.3% [IMF 2010c].  
Changes to the IMF governance structure will also come via the Executive Board. 
The size of the Board will remain at 24 members. However, advanced European 
countries will reduce their contribution to the Board by two. Developing countries will up 
their contribution by the same amount. Further, from 2012, the Executive Board will 
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consist only of elected Executive Directors, “following entry into force of the proposed 
amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, end the category of appointed 
Executive Directors (currently the members with the five largest quotas appoint an 
Executive Director)” [IMF 2010c]. 
Supervisory Role in the World Economy 
Key leaders at the Fund have acknowledged that the institution has not done a 
good enough job at understanding the effects of financial flows on the financial system, 
and in particular, the effects of flow velocity on contagion and crisis. While not a self-
indictment per se, the Fund has been very vocal about the ways in which it can better 
serve the international financial system. Generally, the Fund has communicated that it 
must clarify the Fund’s mandate and improve the role of the Fund in promoting global 
stability. On three issues in particular (cross-border research on capital flows, systemic 
changes in financial regulatory structure, taxes on flows), the Fund has focused a large 
amount of attention. 
Fund Directors have noted that volatile capital flows played an important role in 
the transmission of shocks towards the depth of the current crisis. As it is the Fund’s 
mandate to oversee international monetary stability, the institution acknowledges that it 
must strengthen its ability to “advance in bilateral and multilateral surveillance and policy 
advice for member countries, based on extensive analytical work and taking into account 
country specific circumstances and relevant experiences” and “develop a coherent Fund 
view and inform policy guidance on capital flows” [IMF 2011]. The Fund has initiated 
work on Cross-Cutting Themes from Recent Country Experiences with Capital Flows as a 
starting point from which it can further elaborate its views on how to deal with cross 
border flows. In particular, the Fund has highlighted the need for its research and 
surveillance to focus on the potential spillovers of capital flows and the implications for 
the international monetary system as a whole. 
The Fund has been very vocal on the need for global policy cooperation in the 
international monetary and financial system [IMF 2010b]. Directors at the Fund see it 
necessary that, for the global recovery to accelerate, cooperation on financial regulatory 
architecture must be prioritized. The Fund is currently working hard with member states 
to guard against protectionist and mercantilist policy measures. In doing so, the Fund 
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plans on delivering spillover reports for the world’s major economies that assess the 
impact of domestic policies of systemic countries beyond their own borders [IMF 2010b]. 
Part of this larger surveillance effort involves an enhanced understanding of 
macroeconomic and financial risks and their associated linkages. Similarly, the Fund has 
also produced research and policy proposals on the resolution of cross-border banking 
institutions [Hagan and Vinals, 2010]. 
IMF directors have stressed the need for member states to develop a global 
financial safety net to protect against the threat of future shocks. Much of this discussion 
has centered around the ways in which such a safety net could be initiated. The Fund has 
been at the fore in assessing the potential regulatory and tax policies that could be used to 
develop such a safety net [IMF/G-20, 2010 (There is no link for this cite…it is a leaked 
paper, but I have access to it on my computer, so I can send it to you via e-mail)]. 
 After losing much of its relevance after the Asian financial crisis, the IMF has 
suddenly become the most important financial and monetary institution in the world 
economy (save perhaps the Bank of International Settlements). Its loan portfolio has 
swelled to historic levels. New commitments from member states and direct borrowing 
by the Fund have meant that available resources are also at an all time high. Dozens of 
countries from every continent on the globe have credit arrangements with the Fund 
currently. The Fund’s geographic reach has put it in a unique position to monitor 
financial and economic developments. Critical research and surveillance by the Fund can 
help us better understand the linkages between financial flows and policies within and 
among member states. Greater voice has even been given towards the use of the Fund’s 
SDR as future reserve currency.  
 Such importance and responsibility requires that the Fund seriously consider the 
weight of its continued use of conditionality on member states. No doubt, the Fund is 
carefully considering the viability of its lending model along with the potential easing of 
terms and conditionality in its programs. Recent quota and governance reforms indicate 
that the Fund is at least beginning the process of granting more agency to developing 
countries on the appropriateness of fiscal consolidation and tight monetary policy.  
 As the crisis comes to an end, it will be important if reforms to the Fund’s 
governance and program/facility structure will be long-lasting or ad hoc. Indeed, 
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countries have been granted more autonomy over their decision making in the wake of 
the crisis. Only time can tell whether or not such change is really serious. 
 
 If the argument—motivated and  illustrated by both the AFC and its aftermath and the 
recent global crisis and its aftermath, particularly the still ambiguous but nevertheless 
serious reform-talk at IMF itself---  presented so far is valid, then  several propositions 
can be accepted. First, there may be more than one evolutionary possibility; so there may 
not be a unique, global optimum set of institutions. Second, the goal of achieving stability 
and sustainable growth in a world of scarce resources leads to exercising prudence as a 
principle, particularly when costs are distributed unevenly over space and time. Third, a 
combination off global institutions with regional and national level institutions may 
provide more public good than focusing simply at the global level. The case for RFAs has 
so far rested implicitly on the third proposition. I now wish to elaborate more on this 
point and link it to the formulation of national economic policies and institution building 
at the national level as well. It is best to focus again on a concrete case such as the post-
crisis Asia to give substance to the formal argument. 
 
 
After the AFC, and again after the recent global crisis, the IMF, the World Bank, BIS 
and the national policy making bodies were in intense consultation. The current 
discussion regarding reforms in some ways mimic the  individual  East Asian economies 
responses after the AFC in that they took numerous measures such as  improving bank 
supervision, allowing greater exchange rate flexibility etc. to inoculate themselves against 
future capital account shocks. However,individual countries now just as the Asian 
economies after the AFC  are still vulnerable to  large negative capital account shocks.  
The national strategy of having a very large stock of foreign reserves to deal with large 
capital flight may work but it is an extremely expensive strategy. As the recent global 
crisis shows, no one can foretell how frequent such crises may be, and how expensive; 
but if the past is any guide, even infrequent crises can be quite expensive to manage in 
this manner. This is not to say that such measures should not be taken. On the contrary, 
these measures are and should be a part of the transitional national management strategy. 
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However, more is clearly needed. It seems that following this logic, an increasing number 
of developing country policy makers are realizing that although they may not have the 
capacity to change the international financial architecture immediately, creating a 
regional financial architecture may be an attainable goal. There can be a whole range  of 
regional financial cooperation policies leading to more permanent institution building. 
These could begin with a  peer review process such as  the G7 or preferably, the G20 
process. Using this  as the reference point, a move to mutual liquidity provision and  
some form of enforcement mechanism could be adopted. These could be enhanced 
through exchange rate coordination and enhanced surveillance process . Ultimately, such 
a process could evolve into an RFA that could have its own institutional and 
organizational structure. 
 
In the Asian case, such an evolutionary process had already started after the AFC . The 
most important steps taken then were:the Manila Framework Group Meeting , the 
ASEAN Surveillance Process , the ASEAN+3 Surveillance Process , and  the Chiangmai 
Inititative-related Surveillance Process.  
 
It has to be said that  the performance of Manila Framework Group  as a mechanism for 
regional financial cooperation and regional financial surveillance has not yet reached its 
potential. The reasons are related to institutional incapacity which has prevented the 
parties from specifying clearly  the objectives of information exchange and surveillance. 
Consequently, no priorities, targets, and rules have been  set for the process of 
information exchange and surveillance.Most importantly,there is no actual peer review 
process; the surveillance process seems to be simply  general discussion of the global and 
regional economic outlook. Finally, there seems to be no attempt to formulate any 
country-specific or region-wide recommendations for policy actions--- a point to which I 
will return at the end. 
The other processes also have much  room for improvements and the actual prospects 
for improvement, as shown by the Chiangmai Inititative-related Surveillance Process. In 
addition to an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) that includes all ASEAN 
members and a network of bilateral swap agreements among ASEAN countries plus 
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China, Japan and South Korea, the initiative has opened the door for further discussion 
about concrete policy coordination and institution building. In so far as the swap 
arrangements are concerned, currently 10 percent of the swap arrangements can be 
disbursed without the IMF involvement.  
 Even with this modest beginning, there is now a need for the swap-providing countries  
to formulate their own assessments about the swap-requesting country. Costs of such 
information gathering can be economized through regional cooperation. Such a move will 
also make it possible to  pre-qualify members for assistance if and when the need for such 
assistance arises. This will also help fight contagion and prevent capital flight when 
actions are taken promptly before a crisis point is reached because of avoidable delays. 
Acting in accordance with the principles of prudent management stated earlier, there 
could be a regular policy dialogue at the deputy minister level. Finally, at the 
organizational level,the evolutionary approach could lead to the establishment of an 
independent surveillance unit to serve as the core of an RFA, and  to lead the policy 
dialogue. The proposed  policy dialogue process should pay particular attention to the 
root problems in East Asia’s weak financial systems (e.g. prudential supervision, risk 
management, and corporate governance), and actively promote the development and 
integration of long-term capital markets.  At this point, it is not essential to pinpoint any 
further the precise organizational blueprint for such an RFA; but the point that the 
process underway can result in an appropriate institutional structure with proper 
organizational design is important to grasp. A critical constructive evolutionary  
economic theory suggests that an open architecture will be better able to absorb future 
shocks, learn from them, and modify itself. 28 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis of AFC and subsequent attempts at an incipient Asian 
RFA, at a concrete policy making level, one could make the case for Asian countries 
lobbying for the formalisation and regularisation of ASEAN Chair’s and ASEAN 
Secretary-General’s participation in the G20 Summits.   There is also a regional logic for 
holding policy dialogue meetings of an “expanded” ASEAN+3 (regular 13 members plus 
                                                
28 Although the terminology used is different, Kuroda and Kawai (2002) describe the case for strengthening 
regional financial cooperation in East Asia in terms that lend support to the “open architecture” view with a 
regional component advanced here from an evolutionary perspective. 
 30 
India, Australia and New Zealand) in general but particularly before the G20 Summits for 
coordinating policies and developing common positions to support the ASEAN 
representatives at the G20 Summits. Furthermore, supporting and joining the informal 
Global Governance Group (3G) convened by Singapore under the auspices of the United 
Nations  to coordinate Asian position with developing countries in other regions of the 
world. Another regional institution building possibility is that once the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) is established in Singapore (by May 2010). 
AMRO can coordinate the policy dialogue meetings of the “expanded” ASEAN+3 
overall. Specific moves could include designing coordination in order to support 
participation of the ASEAN Chair and the ASEAN Secretary-General in the G20 
Summits. 
There are two key aspects of such an interrelated architecture that will crucially affect  
the workability of a possible RFA in Asia or in any other region. First, the willingness of 
a reformed IMF to permit the RFAs to have a certain degree of regional autonomy. For 
this the complementarity and burden sharing aspects of the GFA with RFAs need to be 
recognized. This is a special case of complementary institutional network(CIN). Second, 
and another instance of CIN, is the viability and cooperation at the national level. A 
slogan accompanying globalization is that the nation state can no longer act on its own. 
This may be true in certain areas of macroeconomic policy, but on a wide range of issues 
from tax policies to environmental policies the national governments can within limits 
formulate and implement policies. In the area of finance, even under WTO rules, there 
are possibilities of not only policy maneuvering but also of institutional reform and new 
institution building. In addition to addressing such matters as prudential supervision, risk 
management, and corporate governance  the need for building other institutions for risk 
sharing, human development and policy dialogues within the nation loom large as tasks 
during the transitional management  at the national level. 
One final observation regarding the creation of an RFA within Asia is necessary before 
moving to a discussion of the future of the IMF in the next section. To put it in the most 
concrete and perhaps provocative way, could the Chiang Mai initiative foreshadow an 
East Asian Monetary System? 
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The AFC led to a collapse of the dollar pegging most of the economies in East Asia had 
before the crisis. The East Asian economies prefer a certain amount of exchange rate 
stability due to their trade multilateral dependence . They also see some advantages to be 
gained from coordination against speculative attacks, and preventing competitive 
devaluations in the region. However, fixing rates with respect to one another like the 
EMS earlier also carries dangers. Furthermore, the US dollar is still the most important 
vehicle currency in the region.Therefore, whether something like a yen bloc, or even an 
Asian Currency Unit(ACU) can be created in the near future is doubtful. 
At the same time, the experience of the AFC points towards closer coordination and a 
concerted effort to reduce volatility in the currency and financial markets. Since there are 
asymmetries among the countries in the region, the more advanced countries need to take 
the lead and ensure that in times of asymmetric shocks, the less advanced countries will 
have resources to call upon. Thus any kind of steps towards an RFA will have to involve 
adequate reserves and the ability to provide liquidity and other resources to countries that 
need these in times of crisis. 
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5. The Changing Role of the IMF within a Hybrid GFA: 
 
In this section I want to address what is perhaps the most important institutional and 
policy question that arises from the proposal for a hybrid GFA. What will be the role of 
IMF, and how will this new role differ from its present or neoliberal role? As mentioned 
already, the handling of the AFC by the IMF had  raised important issues of global 
governance. The Fund had been criticized by the left, the right, and also the center.The 
global financial crisis has elicited mixed but on the whole potentially constructive 
responses from the IMF. I have already alluded to some of the ways in which the IMF 
will need to change its ways if the hybrid form of GFA I am suggesting here is to become 
a viable option for institution building. Elsewhere29, I have pointed out the need for 
adhering to some basic principles as the IMF transforms itself  consistent with a critical 
social constructivist approach. Chief among these principles are the principle of 
symmetry and the principle of burden sharing.These are described briefly below: 
 
 
1.The principle of symmetry, i.e., the surplus and deficit countries should be treated 
equally. Fowever, it was not realized in the past; nor is it likely to be realized in the near 
future. However, there are various ways to pursue this as a goal even under the current set 
up of the IMF. If serious efforts are made to follow this principle by a reformed IMF, that 
will be an important step towards a new and better GFA. 
2.The principle of burden-sharing, i.e., during episodes of crisis management the IMF 
will share the management burden with the RFAs and through them also with the affected 
countries and their neighbors. 
 
 It should be kept in mind that in keeping with the critical constructivist argument 
developed so far both the principles recognize the practical impossibility of the IMF 
                                                
29 See Khan (2002c). 
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being transformed into a global central bank in the near future. What the IMF cannot do 
now and will not be able to do in the foreseeable future is to follow Bagehot’s dictum to 
lend freely against good collateral at a high interest rate in time of crisis. Unless SDRs 
become the commonly accepted and easily expandable means of settlement, this role will 
remain foreclosed. It is unlikely that the principal shareholders of the IMF will allow 
such a change to occur.30 Also, compared to a national central bank dealing with a 
problematic domestic financial institution the IMF has a limited ability to force corrective 
action. Yet, there will clearly be a role for IMF lending, and the consequent moral hazard 
will need to be recognized. But just as the moral hazard from having fire fighters ready to 
fight fires does not compel thoughtful communities to abolish fire stations, the global 
community also cannot abolish the IMF, or reduce its resources simply because there is a 
moral hazard problem associated with such institutions. The second principle above, the 
principle of burden sharing with the RFAs, national governments and the private sectors 
should go some distance towards both increasing the overall resources available, and 
mitigating the moral hazard. 
While the Fund can not now, or even in the near future be expected to act as a global 
central banker, pressures for increasing the net supply and poor country allocations of 
SDR will have beneficial effects. Even if the increases are not significant in the short run, 
the tendency will keep alive the eventual goal of forming a global central bank, as 
Keynes had envisioned. More practically, putting pressures on the IMF to emit new 
SDRs in order to finance the stabilization of primary ( and perhaps other) commodity 
prices will lead to benefits for both the developing and the developed countries in the 
intermediate run. The stabilization of these prices will help many developing countries 
avert BOP disasters. Furthermore, to the extent that the unusual price increases, such as 
the oil price increase in the 70s, create general inflationary pressures  such pressures can 
also be averted. A smooth international transactions pattern will thus be consistent with 
domestic price stabilization as well.  
 
                                                
30 However, this should not be ruled out completely. Pressures for increased supply of SDRs will be 
beneficial in specific ways as argued below. 
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In addition, the Fund can make a concerted effort to manage the private creditors. Most 
important from the point of view of managing crises will be the incorporation of new 
provisions on loan contracts so that orderly work out procedures become feasible. The 
Fund can also lend into arrears as  a means to provide debtor-in-possession financing. 
Such a provision, along with more direct measures vis-à-vis the creditors, can help to 
bring the creditors to the bargaining table during a crisis. 
Such measures to manage the creditors should also be complemented by increased 
surveillance of financial markets. Strengthening supervision is one aspect. Arriving at 
independent assessments of financial risk is another, related aspect of moving in this 
direction. However, it is important to realize that even after adopting this stance, the risk 
of crises will still remain. Not all crises can be foreseen, much less prevented. The best 
that can be done is to draw the countries, the private sector and the RFAs together in an 
effort to strengthen the financial structures, including information gathering and 
processing capabilities. A cooperative structure where the Fund recognizes the need for 
hybridity will also help to reduce the reaction time. 
Reducing the reaction time can help only if the policies undertaken can not do much 
harm even if they are not successful in achieving their positive aim. The IMF has been 
correctly criticicized for suggesting  a “one-size-fits-all” policy package. Here again, a 
changed institutional structure with a more flexible IMF will mean a case-by-case 
approach where the RFAs will play a significant role. National economic policies such as 
requiring borrowers to unwind positions in increasingly risky situations, curbing 
excessive foreign borrowing, limiting portfolio investment, cautionary policies towards 
derivatives and off- balance sheet items may need to be examined as serious policy 
options. Tobin tax, or individual country taxes of the Chilean variety should also be given 
serious consideration. The mantra of free capital movements together with the refrain 
that there is no alternative needs to be revised appropriately to incorporate the available 
tools that the Fund can help countries use to mitigate the risks arising from such capital 
movements. 
It is not clear that the Fund can do much in instituting a more stable exchange rate 
regime. The pegged rate system, advocated among others, surprisingly by the Wall Street 
Journal, will create  one-way bets for speculators. Free floating, on the other hand, can 
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lead to disasters when exchange rates collapse suddenly instead of finding a new stable 
equilibrium. Such perverse dynamics was observed during the AFC, particularly in the 
Indonesian case. The inability of Greece to use exchange rate policy during its own crisis 
shows how the EU and particularly the ECB may not be a model to emulate for crating 
future RFAs. Neither currency boards nor perfect flexibility can prevent vulnerable 
currencies from collapsing. Rather a managed float before any signs of crisis appear 
together with a prudent management of the financial and real sectors would seem to be 
both pragmatic and feasible at this point. Strengthening the capacities of central banks 
will have better pay off here than urging the IMF to twist the arms of the countries 
through conditionalities. 
In Asia, in addition to the high interest rate standard recipe, the IMF seized the 
crisis as an opportunity to dismantle what remained of the particular mix of institutions 
that had historically evolved to create the so-called “Asian Model of Development”. 
Widespread and massive bank closures, enterprise restructuring, opening up sectors to 
foreign ownership, tearing down labor ibstitutions in the name of flexibility, and attack 
on living standards seemed to be a part of an overarching agenda. This type of radical 
restructuring under duress is not the way to apply the principles that are being advocated 
here.  
In spite of widespread criticism from many quarters, the IMF still remains 
committed to capital account liberalization as an ultimate goal. The AFC, and more 
recent crises have merely given it pause to consider proper sequencing before 
liberalization. The critical constructive evolutionary theory developed here, point to a 
more nuanced, less global approach. Some economies may be ready for capital account 
liberalization; others are not. The IMF needs to distinguish among them carefully, and 
not adopt capital account liberalization as a principle enshrined in its revised articles of 
agreement.  
It goes without saying that proper sequencing, better monitoring and management 
of debt, greater transparency in both the government and private sector operations, more 
effective regulation of of domestic financial institutions are all desirable policy goals. 
Also desirable are domestic tax policies that do not encourage excessive reliance on 
short-term capital inflows. However, in a world of unevenness some countries may also 
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require temporary capital controls through various means. The IMF, instead of taking a 
dogmatic approach that says “no” to any form of capital control should set up facilities 
for examining the impacts of different alternatives. In doing so, it should also pay 
attention to the principle of symmetry so that the borrowing countries do not always and 
everywhere have to take the initiative. At the same time both capital inflows and outflows 
need to be controlled to some extent  
The steps undertaken by the IMF so far are definitely in the right direction but there 
is still a long way to go. A reformed IMF together with the RFAs could take the 
leadership in providing the overall framework within which individual countries could 
pursue policies most advantageous from a systemic point of view. For example, as 
alluded to already, the hybrid GFA could have a framework agreed to by the member 
countries of the IMF so that when a crisis hits lenders would be subject to credit 
standstills and orderly workouts. This would clearly force the creditors to shoulder some 
of the responsibility for the crisis. Such an arrangement, in all likelihood, will also reduce 
the need for large IMF loans. 
 Another part of the new IMF responsibilities could be the collection of a global 
Tobin tax. Although no panacea, such a tax would almost certainly reduce returns to very 
short-term capital movements. A further consequence of a Tobin tax could be a 
somewhat more stable  exchange rate system. Adoption of a securities transactions tax is 
also not a far-fetched idea. Even Lawrence Summers wrote academic articles before he 
joined the government advocating modest taxes on these transactions. 31As any 
international monetary economist knows, the “impossible trinity” of international capital 
mobility, fixed exchange rate system and an independent monetary policy can not all be 
pursued together although Mundell’s carefully specified context for “the assignment 
problem” and his solutions may be applicable in specific instances. Slowing down short 
term capital movement need not prevent long term capital from flowing across borders.  
However, rigidly fixed exchange rates must be given up if countries are still to 
pursue independent monetary policies. Thus, a return to the old IMF is neither necessary 
nor desirable. The transformation of the IMF as a handmaiden of the neoliberal agenda in 
                                                
31 See Summers and Summers(1989). 
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the 1980s shows that  something like a constructivist process was already at work in the 
post BrettonWoods system IMF. Given sufficient political wisdom and will that process 
can be reversed towards creating a transformed IMF that can serve the cause of financial 
stability for global prosperity much better than it has done during the last decades of the 
twentieth century.This new IMF will adopt a more flexible approach towards national 
policies. It will recognize that in periods that seem to be leading towards a crisis there 
may need to be  policy shifts such as a shift towards some types of capital controls.  
The present articles of the IMF actually allow some forms of capital controls when 
countries are in distress. Instead of dismantling, these provisions have to be made 
realistic and applicable whenever the financial system seems vulnerable. Thus flexibility  
and context-dependent policy making will be the key features of a hybrid system. To 
begin with, debt rescheduling, moderation in fiscal-monetary policy mix with an 
expansionary bias for most economies and gradual restructuring of corporate sectors with 
strengthening of standards and corporate governance are steps that IMF can encourage 
the economies to take without interfering directly with the policy making in specific 
countries. 
Other measures that the IMF can allow or even encourage national governments to 
pursue could include requiring lending institutions to hold different levels of provisions 
for countries with different estimated levels of riskiness measured by such factors as the 
state of the banking system and the level of reserves relative to short-term debt. As many 
have observed, risk assessment by the credit rating agencies also leaves much to be 
desired and could be improved if IMF provided some guidance and input. Another, more 
practical measure would be to impose different levels of taxation on earnings from 
overseas investments with different maturities. Although as stated in the previous 
sentence, it will not be so sensitive to individual country risk, it will nevertheless curb 
some of the tendencies towards short-termism. It should be mentioned that the Basel 
Committee regulations in effect during the AFC may have been a culprit in this respect. 
These regulations gave a lower weight to short-term foreign lending (20 per cent) for 
capital adequacy purposes than for loans with a maturity period of over one year (100 per 
cent). A new IMF could make such rules less biased by coordinating its guidelines with 
BIS and the intended Basel III reforms, and being guided by a better theory than the one 
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underlying the Washington consensus. Here some of the Basel III guidelines, if they 
check the currently systemic dysfunctional pro-cyclical tendencies can be helpful. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions: 
 
The history of financial crises shows that they can not be prevented once and for all in a 
monetary economy with unpredictable ebbs and flows in capital movement. This history 
also shows that financial markets have short memories and limited longterm learning 
capacity. Thus there needs to be--- within the limits of human fallibility--- a well-
designed set of institutions capable of dealing with the tendencies towards financial 
instability and crisis. 
 
 In  times of crisis, there are well-meaning suggestions of radical institutional 
restructuring that fade away when the immediate crisis is over. Only a few farsighted or 
worrying types may still voice lingering concerns. Following this literature, but more 
importantly, the recent global crisis and the history of the AFC motivate my proposals for 
moving away from an overarching type of GFA--- to use the terminology developed here.  
 
Given the features of the real economic world, an evolutionary approach admits of 
multiple evolutionary equilibria, and a need for realistic institutional design that 
recognizes path dependence and the role of alternative theories and interpretations 
without the disabling and in most cases incorrect slogan that there is no alternative. 
Although social and political construction of new institutions and arrangements are 
difficult,except for rare circumstances, there are usually more than just one possibility. 
Real struggles among competing ideas, norms and politics at different levels are 
necessary aspects of the process of choosing among these possibilities.  Such a critical 
constructivist approach applied to the recent international financial and economic history 
leads to the identification of two broad categories of global financial architectures. The 
hybrid variety advocated here on the basis of both realism and systemic efficacy and 
equity will nevertheless involve much institution building that is always fraught with the 
danger of politics-gone- awry. 
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The dismantling of Chilean capital controls in 1998 is a case in point. In this particular 
instance, a balance of payments crisis prompted the loosening of capital controls 
instituted earlier(Agonsin 1998). It can be argued that   the situation of policy and 
institutional reversal occurred because the interest groups favoring liberalization 
following a particular world view were strengthened.32 Such interests in Chile included at 
that time holders of foreign exchange, exporters, foreign creditors and investors, and the 
IMF and other international financial institutions. Thus the political problems of coalition 
building and ensuring the least cost cooperative outcome need attention. The limited 
achievements and remaining problems that can be seen from the Asian example discussed 
here should provide concrete motivation to think further about such problems of 
designing institutions in the real world currently 
 
From the policy perspective, it is important to know if the existence of an Asian RFA 
would have helped in any way during the AFC. This is really a counterfactual question 
which asks: suppose there existed an RFA for Asia during the AFC, how would it have 
responded to the crisis that would have been different?  
In contrast with the behavior of the IMF, within the proposed hybrid GFA, a regional 
financial architecture, had it been present could have done at least the following on the 
basis of applying an evolutionary theory of financial instabilities under globalization: 
1.Through constant regional monitoring it would have sensed the danger ahead of 
time. Even a regional monitoring unit alone would have been able to do better than the 
IMF team in Asia. 
2.Through constant formal and informal contact with the officials in member 
governments and the private sector, it would have sized up the possible extent of the 
problem earlier and better than did the IMF. 
3.Through prompt and early action it would have provided liquidity to the system, 
and punished bad management in coordinated measures with the national governments. 
                                                
32 See Dean(1998). 
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4.It would have been able to start regional discussions about bankruptcy and work out 
procedures by keeping in  close touch with the history and legal issues facing particular 
countries. 
5.It would have been in a position to use both moral suasion and toughness to keep 
both regional creditors and debtors in line. 
 
 
The fundamental requirement for this, however, was an actually existing RFA with 
enough liquidity and technical expertise. The Asian Development Bank provided quite a 
bit of liquidity to Korea in particular, but did not even have a monitoring unit when the 
crisis broke out. Furthermore, the autonomy and integrity of  any future RFA, in Asia and 
elsewhere are issues that need discussion. The relationship between the RFAs and the 
IMF also needs to be further specified. These are matters that are of necessity 
evolutionary by nature. In this paper, I have tried to specify some principles that may 
help in selecting the more beneficial evolutionary path. 
Once there is a full fledged regional financial architecture for Asia, for instance, it 
could be a regional lender of last resort. It could also perform effective surveillance 
functions. In addition, it could promote financial and corporate restructuring that is 
necessary, but almost impossible for the IMF to do. Finally, in the event of a future 
global or regional crisis, a more timely response could come from such an RFA already 
in place. In addition to East Asia such useful RFAs could be constructed in South Asia, 
the MENA region, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. In EU, ironically, a 
deconstruction towards a more flexible RFA through a reform of ECB and a construction 
of a more benign federalist revenue-sharing fiscal structure may be what is needed.33 
The critical constructivist  argument developed so far points to the possibility of using 
our knowledge, interpretative flexibility within reasonable limits and political skills and 
ingenuity to utilize existing institutions together with some new ones to achieve desirable 
goals of global financial governance. In case of GFA, this argument strengthens the case 
                                                
33 See Underhill, Geoffrey. 2011 (forthcoming). 'Paved with Good Intentions: Global Financial Integration 
and the Eurozone's Response', European Political Science, 3.  
 
 41 
for developing the hybrid variety. Using both the existing global institutions such as the 
IMF, albeit in a modified form, and building upon existing regional initiatives may offer 
a better chance of creating a beneficial makeshift hybrid GFA than the textbook type pie-
in-the-sky schemes correctly dismissed by Eichengreen. However, Eichengreen does not 
consider the role of RFAs in his otherwise excellent analysis. One way to read the present 
paper is to see it as filling this gap by using an evolutionary constructivist argument for a 
hybrid GFA. A set of realistic reforms of the IMF together with the formation of RFAs 
will offer the best chance for the global economy to achieve stability and prosperity with 
equity. 
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